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Abstract
Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface
of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous approaches that aempt to design revenue optimal
auctions for the multi-dimensional seings fall short in at least one of the three aspects: 1) representation — search
in a space that probably does not even contain the optimal mechanism; 2) exactness — nding a mechanism that is
either not truthful or far from optimal; 3) domain dependence — need a dierent design for dierent environment
seings.
To resolve the three diculties, in this paper, we put forward a unied neural network based framework that
automatically learns to design revenue optimal mechanisms. Our framework consists of a mechanism network
that takes an input distribution for training and outputs a mechanism, as well as a buyer network that takes a
mechanism as input and output an action. Such a separation in design mitigates the diculty to impose incentive
compatibility constraints on the mechanism, by making it a rational choice of the buyer. As a result, our framework
easily overcomes the previously mentioned diculty in incorporating IC constraints and always returns exactly
incentive compatible mechanisms.
We then applied our framework to a number of multi-item revenue optimal design seings, for a few of which
the theoretically optimal mechanisms are unknown. We then go on to theoretically prove that the mechanisms
found by our framework are indeed optimal.
1 Introduction
Designing revenue optimal mechanisms in various seings has been a central research agenda in economics, ever
since the seminal works of Vickrey [26] and Myerson [17] in single item auctions. Lately, designing optimal mech-
anisms for selling multiple items has also been established as an important research agenda at the interface of eco-
nomics and computer sciences [6, 14, 13, 3, 4, 15, 28, 21, 29, 22, 23]
Due to diversity in the researchers’ backgrounds, there are a number of quite dierent angles to study this prob-
lem. e standard economics theme aims to understand the exact optimal mechanisms in various seings. To name
a few, Armstrong [2] obtains the revenue optimal mechanisms of selling two items to one buyer, whose valuations
of the two items are perfect positively correlated (a ray through the origin). Manelli and Vincent [16] obtains partial
characterization of optimal mechanisms, in the form of extremely points in the mechanism spaces. Pavlov [19] de-
rives optimal mechanisms for two items when the buyer has symmetric uniform distributions. Daskalakis et al. [8]
characterizes sucient and necessary conditions for a mechanism to optimal and derive optimal mechanisms for two
items for several valuation distributions. Tang and Wang [23] obtain the revenue optimal mechanisms of selling two
items, of which the valuations are perfect negatively correlated. Yao [29] obtains the revenue optimal mechanisms
of selling two additive items to multiple buyers, whose valuation towards the items are binary and independent.
Another category of research rooted in the AGT community aims to resolve the diculties of characterizing
optimal mechanisms via the lens of algorithm design. Cai et al. [3] and Alaei et al. [1] gives algorithmic characteri-
zations of the optimal BIC mechanisms on discrete distributions using linear programs. Hartline and Roughgarden
[14], Yao [28], Hart and Nisan [13] nd approximately optimal mechanisms in various seings. Carroll [5] shows
that for a certain multi-dimensional screening problem, the worst-case optimal mechanism is simply to sell each
item separately.
e third category, at the interface of AI and economics, aims to search for the optimal mechanisms via various
AI approaches. Conitzer and Sandholm [6] model the problem of revenue and welfare maximization as an instance
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of constraints satisfaction problem (CSP) through which the optimal mechanism may be found using various search
techniques, despite its general computation complexity. Sandholm and Likhodedov [21] model a restricted revenue
maximization problem (within ane maximizing auctions) as a parameter search problem in a multi-dimensional pa-
rameter space, they nd several sets of parameters that yields good empirical revenue. Du¨ing et al. [9] aims to learn
optimal mechanisms by repeatedly sampling from the distribution. ey obtain mechanisms that are approximately
optimal and approximately incentive compatible.
One advantage of these computational approaches is that most of them are constructive so that one can systemat-
ically and computationally generate optimal mechanisms. However, a diculty for most existing works in computer
science (the second and third categories) is that mechanisms obtained this way are either not optimal in the exact
sense, or not truthful in the exact sense. As a result, a typical economist may have a hard time to appreciate this
type of results. A more desirable approach would be constructive on one hand and be able return exact incentive
compatible and (hopefully) exact optimal mechanisms on the other hand.
1.1 Our methodology
In this paper, motivated by the above observation, we aim to put forward a computational approach that can design
or assist one to design exact IC and optimal mechanisms. Similar to the approach introduced by Du¨ing et al.
[9], we train a neural network that represents the optimal mechanism using the valuation distributions. Unlike
their approach, however, we introduce another neural network that represents buyer’s behavior. In particular, this
network takes a mechanism as input, and output an action. Our network structure resembles that of the generative
adversarial nets (GAN) [10] but is essentially dierent because we do not need to train the buyer’s network. is
independent buyer network allows us to easily model the exact IC constraints (which has been a major diculty in
previous works) in our network and any behavior model of this form. In contrast, Du¨ing et al. [9] rst propose
to hardwire the IC constraints into the mechanism network (which requires a lot of domain knowledge and the
structure of the networks has to be domain specic), as a result their approach can only reproduce mechanisms in
the domains where the form of the optimal mechanism is known. To circumvent this diculty, they further propose
to add IC as a so constraint so that the training objective is to minimize a linear combination of revenue loss and
the degree of IC violations. However, this would produce mechanisms that are not IC.
Another innovation of our approach is that we represent a mechanism as a menu (a list of (valuation, outcome)
tuples) in the single buyer case. According to the taxation principle [27], by simply leing the buyer do the selection,
we get an IC mechanism. An additional merit of using a menu to represent a mechanism is that it enables explicit
restrictions of the menu size of the mechanism, which measures the degree of complexity of a mechanism [12].
1.2 Our results
We then apply our learning-aided mechanism design framework to the domain where a seller sells two items to one
buyer. In particular, we investigate the following problems.
• What is the revenue optimal mechanisms when the menu size is restricted to a constant? To the best of our
knowledge, the optimal mechanism of this kind remains unknown for our seing.
• What is optimal mechanism for the case where the valuation domain is a triangle? e previously studied
cases on this domain all focuses on rectangle shaped valuation domain (expect for Haghpanah and Hartline
[11]).
• What is the revenue optimal deterministic mechanism?
• What is the revenue optimal mechanism when the buyer has combinatorial value?
Some of the experimental results we obtained is shown in Table 1 with comparison to the exact optimal mecha-
nisms (some of them are previously known results, while the others are our new ndings).
Inspired by these empirical ndings, using the techniques by Daskalakis et al. [8] and Pavlov [20], we then prove
the exact optimal mechanisms for the rst two problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst time to nd
the exact optimal mechanisms in these domains, so they are of independent interests to the economics society as
well.
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Distributions Computed Mech Rev1 Optimal Mech Rev Optimality
U[0, 1]2 0.5491989 (12 + 2√2)/27 ≥ 99.9996%
U[0, 1] × [0, 1.5] 0.6838542 (15 + 2√3)/27 ≥ 99.9997%
U[0, 1] × [0, 1.9] 0.7888323 (17.4 + 2√3.8)/27 ≥ 99.9988%
U[0, 1] × [0, 2] 0.8148131 22/27 ≥ 99.9997%
U[0, 1] × [0, 2.5] 0.9435182 1019/1080 ≥ 99.99996%
U[0, 1]2 menu size ≤ 3 0.5462947 59/108 ≥ 99.9997%
U[0, 1]2 menu size ≤ 2 0.5443309 59/108 ≥ 99.99997%
U{v1, v2 ≥ 0|v1/2 + v2 ≤ 1} 0.5491225 (12 + 2
√
2)/27 ≥ 99.9857%
Table 1: Comparison with optimal mechanisms, where Optimality = Rev/OptRev.
eorem (Restricted Menu Size). e optimal mechanism for an additive buyer, v ∼ U[0, 1]2, with menu size no more
than 3 is to either sell the rst item at price 2/3 or sell the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108.
In particular, the optimal mechanism must be asymmetric even if the distribution is symmetric!
eorem (Uniform Distribution on a Triangle). e optimal mechanism for an additive buyer with value uniformly
distributed in {(v1, v2)|v1/c + v2 ≤ 1, v1, v2 ≥ 0} (hence a correlated distribution) is as follows:
• if c ∈ [1, 4/3], two menu items: [(0, 0), 0] and [(1, 1),√c/3];
• if c > 4/3, three menu items: [(0, 0), 0], [(1, 1), 2c/3 + √c(c − 1)/3], and [(1/c, 1), 2/3].
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the automated mechanism design problem for the single-buyer multi-dimensional seing.
In this section, we introduce the basic notions for optimal multidimensional mechanism design problem.
Environment e seller has m heterogeneous items for sale, and the buyer has dierent private values for receiving
dierent bundles of the items. An allocation of the items is specied by a vector x ∈ X ⊆ [0, 1]m, where xi is the
probability of allocating the i-th item to the buyer. An allocation x is called a deterministic allocation, if x ∈ {0, 1}m;
otherwise a randomized allocation or a loery allocation.
A possible outcome of the mechanism consists of a valid allocation vector x ∈ X and a monetary transfer amount
p ∈ R+, called payment, from the buyer to the seller.
With the standard quasi-linear utility assumption, the valuation function v : X 7→ R+ describes the private
preference of the buyer, i.e., an outcome 〈x, p〉 is (weakly) preferred than another outcome 〈x ′, p′〉, if and only if:
u(x, p; v) := v(x) − p ≥ v(x ′) − p′ = u(x ′, p′; v).
In other words, the outcome with the highest utility is most preferred by the buyer.
Mechanism A naı¨ve mechanism (without applying the revelation principle) is dened by a set of actions and a
mapping from the set of actions to the set of outcomes. Note that according to the taxation principle [27], simply
leing the buyer do the selection, we get an incentive compatible mechanism. Formally,
Denition 2.1 (Naı¨ve Mechanism). A naı¨ve mechanism consists of an action set A and an associated mapping from
any action to a possible outcome, i.e., 〈x, p〉 : A 7→ X × R+.
In particular, there exists a special action ⊥ meaning “exiting the mechanism” such that
x(⊥) = 0, p(⊥) = 0. (Exit)
1e computed revenue is NOT directly given by the loss of our network. Instead, we ignore the buyer network and compute the expected
revenue according only to the menu given by our network.
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In such a naı¨ve mechanism, a strategy of the buyer is then a mapping from the set of private valuation functions
to the action set, i.e., s : V 7→ A. Furthermore, if the buyer is rational, then her strategy must maximize her utility:
s(v) ∈ argmax
s′∈S
u(x(s′(v)), p(s′(v)); v). (Rational)
e corresponding outcomes of the actions are also known as menu items. roughout this paper, we use [x, p]
to denote a specic menu item, e.g., the zero menu item [0, 0] = [(0, . . . , 0), 0] is the corresponding menu item of
the exiting action ⊥. Note that the naı¨ve mechanism with the menu presentation is a very general model of the
mechanism design problem. In particular, even when the buyer is not fully rational, as long as a buyer behavior
is available, the mechanism designer is still able to design the menus to maximize his objective assuming that the
buyer responses according to the given behavior model. e robustness of naı¨ve mechanisms is indeed critical to
the exibility and generality of our methodology.
Direct Mechanism With the above denition of naı¨ve mechanisms, it is hard to characterize all the mechanisms
with certain properties, because the design of the action set, at rst glance, could be arbitrary. One critical step in
the mechanism design theory is to applying the celebrating revelation principle [18, p.224] to restrict the set of naı¨ve
mechanisms to a considerably smaller set of mechanisms — the direct mechanisms. In a direct mechanism, the action
set is restricted to be identical to the set of valuation functions and the identity mapping also is required to be an
optimal strategy for any rational buyer. Formally,
Denition 2.2 (Direct Mechanism). A direct mechanism xes the action set A = V and remains to specify the
mapping fromV to the set of possible outcomes.
In addition, the identity mapping must be a utility-maximizing strategy for any rational buyer, which can be equiv-
alently stated as the following incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) constraints:
v ∈ argmax
v′∈V
u(x(v′), p(v′); v), (IC)
u(x(v), p(v); v) ≥ 0. (IR)
In fact, the constraints (IC) and (IR) are deduced from the constraints (Rational) and (Exit).
e Designer’s Goal e goal of the mechanism designer is to maximize the expectation of his objective r : X×R+ 7→
R, where the expectation is taken over his prior knowledge about the buyer’s private valuation function, i.e., v ∼ F .
We emphasize that our methodology is not restricted to any specic objective. However, in this paper, we would
focus on the seing with the seller’s revenue as the objective:
r(x, p) = p. (Objective)
Because revenue-optimal mechanism design in multi-dimensional environment is a both challenging and widely
studied problem. Hence applying our method in such a seing allows us to verify that (i) whether it can nd the
optimal or nearly optimal solution, and (ii) whether it can provide a simpler approach to a hard problem.
Assumptions In most sections of this paper, we will make to the following two assumptions (Assumption 2.3 and
Assumption 2.4). As we just stated, we would rst verify that our method can be used to recover the optimal solutions
to some known problems and lile exact optimal solution is actually discovered without these two assumptions.
Assumption 2.3 (Additive Valuation Functions). e buyer’s valuation function v is additive, i.e., v can be decomposed
as follows:
v(x) =
∑
i∈[m]
vi xi,
where vi ∈ R+.
With the additive valuation assumption, we refer each vi as the value of the i-th item. Moreover, we can make
the following independent value assumption in addition.
Assumption 2.4 (Independent Values). e prior distribution F is independent in each dimension and can be decom-
posed as F = F1 × · · · × Fm, where each vi is independently drawn from Fi , i.e., vi ∼ Fi .
In the meanwhile, to show that our method is not limited to these assumptions, in Section 5, we show how it
can be applied to seings without these assumptions. In particular, with the help of the characterization results
by Daskalakis et al. [8], we are able to verify the optimality of the solution to an instance with correlated value
distribution (while still with additive valuation functions).
4
3 Problem Analysis
Although the revelation principle is widely adopted by the theoretical analysis of mechanism design problems to
eciently restrict the design spaces, we decided not to follow this approach when applying neural networks to solve
such problems.
e main diculty of directly following the traditional revelation principle based approach is two-fold:
• It is unclear that what network structure can directly encode the incentive compatible (IC) and individually
rational (IR) constraints;
• Some of the characterization results for additive valuation seing2 can be cast to certain network structures,
but such structures are restricted (to additive valuation assumption) and heavily rely on the domain knowledge
of the specic mechanism design problem.
In fact, the above diculties also limit the generality of the methods built on these elegant but specic charac-
terizations. For example, there might be some fundamental challenges while generalizing such approaches to the
seings where the buyer is risk-averse (risk-seeking) or has partial (or bounded) rationality, etc. Furthermore, in
many real applications, the buyer behavior models may come from real data instead of pure theoretical assumptions.
To circumvent these diculties and ensure the highest extendability, in this paper, we build up our method from
the most basic naı¨ve mechanisms — simply let the buyer choose her favorite option — which is even more close to
the rst principles of how people make decisions. Interestingly, via this approach, our method will automatically
produce an exactly incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst neural network based approach that outputs an both exactly incentive compatible and exactly individually
rational mechanism under multi-dimensional seings.
3.1 Revisiting the Naı¨ve Mechanism
We then briey explain show how the naı¨ve mechanism helps us to formulate a neural network based approach for
mechanism design.
Intuitively, the naı¨ve mechanism in our context simply provides the buyer various menu items, i.e., allocations
associated with dierent prices, and lets her choose the most prefered one. In this case, once a buyer utility function
is specied (either by assumption or learnt from data), the choice of the buyer is simply an argmax of the utility
function. As long as the utility function could be encoded via neural network, which is a mild assumption, the
buyer’s behavior model can encoded as a neural network with an additional argmax layer.3
High-level sketch of the network structure For now, we can think the encoded mechanism as a black-box that outputs
a set of allocation-payment pairs (see Figure 1(a)). ese pairs then are feeded into many “buyer networks”, each with
dierent private valuation functions (hence dierent choices). Finally, the “buyer networks” output their choices and
the choices are used to evaluate the expected objective of the mechanism designer, where the choices are weighted
according to the probabilities of the corresponding private valuation functions and the training loss is simply the
negative of the expected objective.
One key advantage of formulating the network as a naı¨ve mechanism rather than a direct mechanism is that no
additional constraints (such as IC and IR) are required for the former. In fact, the diculty of optimizing the direct
mechanism network (see Figure 1(b)) is that the violations of IC or IC constraints are not directly reected in the
designer’s objective. Hence the standard optimization methods for neural networks do not directly apply. In con-
trast, in the naı¨ve mechanism network, the eect of any mechanism outcome mutations on the buyer preferences is
reected in the designer’s objective via the “buyer networks”. Such properties facilitate the optimization in standard
training methods of neural networks.
4 Network Structure
Our network structure contains two networks: the mechanism network and the buyer network. Since the networks
represent a naı¨ve mechanism, the output of the mechanism network is a set of choices along with dierent prices (or
2Such as Myerson’s virtual value for single-dimension and Rochet’s increasing, convex and Lipschitz-1 buyer utility function for multi-
dimension [9].
3Even if the buyer utility function is not available, such a gadget could be replaced by any buyer behavior model (either given or learnt from
data), which is encoded as a neural network.
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(b) Direct mechanism structure
Figure 1: A high-level abstraction of the neural networks.
menu items) and the buyer network takes the set of menu items as input and outputs its choice. e overall network
structure is shown in Figure 2.
4.1 Mechanism Network
In most applications, a neural network usually takes a possible input x and then outputs a possible output y. However,
our mechanism network is dierent from most neural networks in the sense that its output is a set of menu items,
which already represents the entire mechanism. erefore, our mechanism network does not actually need to take
an input to give an output.
However, in order to t in with most neural network frameworks, we use a one dimensional constant 1 as the
input of our mechanism network. e output of the network consists of two parts. e rst part is an allocation
matrix X of m rows and k columns, where m is the number of items and k is the number of menu items. Each column
of the allocation matrix contains the allocation of all m item. e second part is a payment vector p of length k ,
representing k dierent prices for the k menu items. e last column of the allocation matrix and the last element
of the payment vector is always set to be 0. is encodes the “exit” choice of the buyer and ensures that the buyer
can always choose this menu item to guarantee individual rationality.
e structure of the mechanism network is simple enough. e constant input 1 goes through a 1 fully connected
layer to form each row Xi (except the last column, which is always 0) of the allocation matrix. We choose the sigmoid
function as the activation function since the allocation of each item is always inside the interval [0, 1]. e payment
vector is even simpler. Each element pi of the payment vector is formed by multiplying the input constant by a scalar
parameter. erefore, the training of our network is very fast, since the network structure is very simple.
4.2 Buyer Network
e buyer network is a function that maps a mechanism to the buyer’s strategy s(v) (a distribution over all possible
menu items) for each value prole v = (v1, v2, . . . , vm), where each vi is the value of geing the i-th item. e output
of the mechanism network (the allocation matrix X and the payment vector p) is taken as the input of the buyer
network. To dene the output of the buyer network, suppose that each vi is bounded and 0 ≤ vi ≤ v¯i . We discretize
the interval [0, v¯i] to di discrete values. Let Vi be the set of possible discrete values of vi and dene V = ∏i∈[m] Vi .
e output of the buyer network is a m + 1 dimensional tensor, with the rst m dimension corresponding the
buyer’sm dimensional value, and the last dimension representing the probability of choosing each menu item. ere-
fore, the i-th (i ≤ m) dimension of the tensor has length di and the last dimension has length k .
Although here we use the same notation as in Assumption 2.3, this notation does not lose generality since we
do not make any assumption about the buyer’s valuation of obtaining multiple items or only a fraction of an item.
It is also worth mentioning that the buyer’s utility function is not necessary to build the buyer network, since the
network only outputs buyer’s strategy, which may not even be consistent with any utility function.
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Figure 2: Overall network structure. e buyer network corresponds to a rational buyer with quasi-linear utilities.
In other cases, the buyer network can be constructed according to his utility function, or other networks trained
from interaction data.
e buyer network can be any type of network that has the same format of input and output as described above.
When we do not know the buyer’s exact utility function but have plenty of interaction data (e.g., the sponsored
search seing), we can train the buyer network with the the interaction data.
When the buyer’s utility function is known, we can manually design the buyer network structure so that the
network outputs the buyer’s strategy more accurately. For example, when Assumption 2.3 and Assumption 2.4
holds, we know that the buyer always choose the menu item that maximizes his additive valuation with probability
1. We can construct m tensors V1,V2, . . . ,Vm, with size d1×d2×· · ·×dm. In Vi , an element’s value is only determined
by its i-th dimensional index in the tensor, and it equals the j-th discretized value of the interval [0, v¯i], if its i-th
dimensional index is j . Recall that the i-th row of the allocation matrix Xi represents dierent allocations of the i-th
item in dierent menu items. We then multiply the i-th tensor with the Xi to get an m + 1 dimensional tensor Xi
with size d1 × d2 × · · · × dm × k .
We also construct a payment tensorP with size d1 × d2 × · · · × dm × k , where an element equals to the pi if its
index for the last dimension is j .
Finally, we compute the utility tensor U by
U =
©­«
∑
i∈[m]
Xi
ª®¬ −P
And then apply the somax function to the last dimension of the utility tensorU to produce the outputS , which is
an aggregation of s(v), ∀v ∈ V . One can easily verify that for each value prole, the menu with the largest utility has
the highest probability of being chosen. Of course, we also multiply the utility tensor by a large constant to make
the probability of the best menu item close enough to 1.
4.3 Loss Function
e loss function can be any function specied according the mechanism designer’s objective. However, in this
paper, we mainly focus on how to optimize the revenue of the mechanism and set the loss function to be the negative
revenue.
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Figure 3: Comparison between computed solutions and optimal solutions.
Recall that the output of the buyer network is the buyer’s strategy s(v) for each value prole v. en the loss
function of the networks is
Loss = −Rev = −
∑
v∈V
Pr [v] pT s(v)
where Pr [v] is the probability that v appears, which can be easily computed from the joint value distribution F .
Note that in the above loss function, we do not make any assumption about the probability distribution Pr[v].
Our networks are able to handle any joint distribution, including correlated ones.
5 Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we rst list some results of our neural networks in Section 5.1. Inspired by these results, we are able
to nd the closed-form optimal mechanisms in some cases. We list theoretical analysis and proofs in Section 5.2.
5.1 Experiment results
5.1.1 Uniform [0, c] × [0, 1]
e optimal mechanism for this seing is already known [24]. We draw both the optimal mechanism and our
experiments results together in Figure 3. e color blocks represents the mechanism given by our network, where
each color corresponds to a dierent menu item. e dashed line represents the optimal mechanism (they are NOT
drawn according to the color blocks). e two mechanisms are almost identical except for the slight dierence in
Figure 3(c).
5.1.2 Correlated Distribution: Uniform Triangle
Suppose that the buyer’s value v = (v1, v2) is uniformly distributed among the triangle described by v1c + v2 ≤ 1, v1 ≥
0, v2 ≥ 0, where c ≥ 1. e color blocks in Figure 4 show the mechanisms given by our network. Note that in our
framework, the joint value distribution is only used to compute the objective function. So our framework can handle
arbitrary value distributions.
In fact, guided by these experiment results, we are able to nd the closed-form optimal mechanism for this kind
of value distributions. In particular, there are two possible cases for this problem. When c is large, the optimal
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Figure 4: Uniform Triangle.
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(a) At most 2 menus.
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(b) At most 3 menus.
Figure 5: Uniform [0, 1]2 with restricted menu size.
mechanism contains two menu items. And when c is small, the optimal contains only two menus, i.e., use a posted
price for the bundle of the items. Formally, we have
eorem 5.1. When c > 43 , the optimal menu for the uniform triangle distribution contains the following items: (0, 0), 0,
( 1c , 1), 23 , and (1, 1), 23c − 13
√
c(c − 1).
When c ≤ 43 , the optimal menu for the uniform triangle distribution contains the following items: (0, 0), 0 and
(1, 1),√ c3 .
e proof is deferred to Section 5.2.
5.1.3 Restricted Menu Size
e output of our mechanism network is a set of menus. us we can control the menu size by directly seing the
output size of the network.
Restricting the menu size results in simpler mechanisms. It is known that the optimal menu for some distributions
contains innitely many items [8]. Such results directly motivates the study of simple mechanisms, since they are
easier to implement and optimize in practice.
We consider the case where the buyer’s value is uniformly distributed in the unit square [0, 1]2. It is known
that the optimal mechanism contains 4 menu items. When the menu can only contain at most 2 items, the optimal
mechanism is to trivially set a posted price for the bundle. e experiment results are shown in Figure 5.]
Surprisingly, when the menu can have at most 3 items, our network gives an asymmetric menu, despite that the
value distribution is symmetric. In fact, we can also nd the optimal menu with at most 3 items analytically. Our
analysis shows that the optimal menu is indeed asymmetric. e intuition is that, if we add a symmetry constraint
to the solution, then the optimal menu degenerates to a 2-item one. We provide the theoretical result here, but defer
the proof to Section 5.2.
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eorem 5.2. e optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1]2 is to sell the rst
item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108 ≈ 0.546296.
By symmetry, the mechanism could also be selling the second item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price
5/6. In particular, these is no other at-most-three-menu mechanisms could generate as much revenue as they do.
5.1.4 Unit-Demand Buyer
e unit-demand seing is also intensively studied in the literature. In this seing, the allocation must satisfy
x1 + x2 ≤ 1. [25] provides detailed analysis and closed-form solutions on the unit-demand seing. With slight
modications, our mechanism network can also produce feasible allocations in this seing. Instead of applying the
sigmoid function to each element of the allocation matrix, we apply a somax function to each column (representing
each menu item) of the allocation matrix. However, with such a modication, the allocation satises x1 + x2 = 1
rather than x1 + x2 ≤ 1. e solution is to add an extra dummy element to each column before applying the somax
function.
e experiment results are shown in Figure 6(a).
v1
v2
1.5 2.5
2.5
(a) Unit demand. (b) Combinatorial Value.
v1
v2
0 2
1
(c) Deterministic allocation.
Figure 6: Empirical results.
5.1.5 Combinatorial Value
Our framework structure can also handle the case where the buyer has combinatorial values. e following Figure
6(b) shows mechanism given by our network for a buyer with u(v1, v2) = x1v1 + x2v2 + v1v2 − p. In this case, we need
to slightly modify the buyer network by adding the extra v1v2 term, which can be easily implemented.
5.1.6 Deterministic Mechanisms
We can use our networks to nd the optimal deterministic mechanisms for any joint value distributions. Similar
to the restricted menu size case, deterministic mechanisms are also important in practice, since they are easy to
understand and implement. In this case, the mechanism network can be further simplied, since for selling 2 items,
there can only be 4 possible deterministic menu items, with allocations (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). erefore, the only
parameters in the mechanism network are the corresponding prices.
Figure 6(c) shows our experiment results on uniform distributions among the triangle described in subsubsec-
tion 5.1.2. According to eorem 5.1, the optimal mechanism is not deterministic when c = 2, Our experiments show
that such a constraint decreases the revenue by 0.14%.
5.2 eoretically Provable Optimal Mechanisms
In this section, we provide theoretical proofs for some of the ndings via our neural network. To the best of our
knowledge, these results are previously unknown.
5.2.1 Optimal mechanisms for selling two items with correlated distributions
As described in Section 5.1.2, there are two possible cases for the optimal mechanism when the buyer’s value is
uniformly distributed among the triangle. e solutions are shown in Figure 7. We solve the problem case by case.
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(1, 1), 2c −
√
c(c − 1)
3
(a) When c > 43
v1
v2
0 c
1
(0, 0), 0
(1, 1),
√
c
3
(b) When c ≤ 43
Figure 7: Uniform Triangle.
eorem 5.3. For any c > 43 , suppose that the buyer’s type is uniformly distributed among the set T = {(v1, v2) | v1c +
v2 ≤ 1, v1 ≥ 0, v2 ≥ 0}. en the optimal menu contains the following items: (0, 0), 0, ( 1c , 1), 23 , and (1, 1), 23c− 13
√
c(c − 1).
Remark 5.4. Note that the condition c > 43 guarantees that the price of the third menu item is positive.
To prove eorem 5.3, we apply the duality theory in [8, 7] to our seing. We provide a brief description here
and refer readers to [8] and [7] for details.
Let f (v) be the joint value distribution of v = (v1, v2), and V be the support of f (v). Dene measures µ0, µ∂, µs
as follows:
• µ0 has a single point mass at v = 0, i.e., µ0(V) = I(v ∈ A), where I(·) is the indicator function, and v ∈ A is
the smallest type in V .
• µ∂ is only distributed along the boundary ofV , with a density f (v)(v ·η(v)), where η(v) is the outer unit normal
vector at v.
• µs is distributed in V with a density ∇ f (v) · v + (n + 1) f (v), where n is the number of items.
Let µ = µ0 + µ∂ − µs . Dene µ+ and µ− to be two non-negative measures such that µ = µ+ − µ−. Let V+ and V−
be the support sets of µ+ and µ−. [8, 7] shows that designing an optimal mechanism for selling n items to 1 buyer is
equivalent to solving the following program:
sup
∫
V
u dµ+ −
∫
V
u dµ−
s.t. u(v) − u(v′) ≤ ‖(v − v′)+‖1, ∀v ∈ V+, v′ ∈ V− (P)
u is convex, u(v) = 0
where u(v) is the utility of the buyer when his value is v, and ‖(v − v′)+‖1 = ∑ni=1 max(0, vi − v′i ).
Relax the above program by removing the convexity constraint and write the dual program of the relaxed pro-
gram:
inf
∫
V×V
‖(v − v′)+‖1 dγ
s.t. γ ∈ Γ(µ+, µ−) (D)
where Γ(µ+, µ−) is the set of non-negative measures γ dened over V × V such that, for any V ′ ⊆ V , the following
equations hold: ∫
V ′×V
dγ = µ+(V ′) and
∫
V×V ′
dγ = µ−(V ′)
Lemma 5.5 ([8]). (D) is a weak dual of (P).
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We omit the proof here but refer readers to [8] and [7] for details. e dual program (D) has an optimal transport
interpretation. We “move” the mass from µ+ to other points to form µ− and the measure γ corresponds to the amount
of mass that goes from each point to another in V .
Although (D) is only a weak dual of (P), we can still use it to certify the optimality of a solution. We already give
a menu in eorem 5.3. erefore, the relaxed convexity constraint is automatically satised if the buyer always
choose the best menu item.
In our seing, f (v) = 2c , and we have that V = T , v = (0, 0), µ∂ has a constant line density of 2√1+c2 along the
segment v1c + v2 = 1, 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 1, and µs has a constant density of 6c over T .
Let Ri be the region of T such that for any v ∈ Ri , choosing menu item i maximizes the buyer’s utility.
It is straightforward to verify that the measures µ+ and µ− are balanced inside each region, i.e., µ+(Ri) =
µ−(Ri), ∀i. erefore, the transport of mass only happens inside each region.
We construct the transport in R1 and R2 as follows:
• R1: µ+ is concentrated on a single point 0. We move the mass at 0 uniformly to all points in R1;
• R2: µ+ is only distributed along the upper boundary of R2. For each point v at the upper boundary, we draw
a vertical line l through it, and move the mass at v uniformly to the points in L ∩ R2.
However, for R3, µ+ is also only distributed along the upper boundary, but there is no easy transport as for R1
and R2. We provide the following Lemma 5.6.
Lemma 5.6. For R3, there exists a transport of mass, such that for any two points v, v′, if there is non-negative transport
from v to v′, then vi ≥ v′i, ∀i.
e proof of Lemma 5.6 is deferred to Appendix A.1. With this lemma, we can simplify our proof of eorem
5.3, and do not need to construct the measure γ explicitly.
Proof of eorem 5.3. Point D in Figure 10 has coordinates (xD, yD), where xD = 23c − 13
√
c(c − 1) − 13
√
c
c−1 and
yD =
1
3
√
c
c−1 . erefore,
Pr{e buyer chooses menu item 2} = f (v) · S(YCDI) = 2
c
· 13 xD
Pr{e buyer chooses menu item 3} = f (v) · S(CDEX) = 2
c
[
c
2
(
1
3 + yD
)2
− 12 y
2
D
]
us the revenue of the menu provided in eorem 5.3 is:
Rev = 23 · Pr{e buyer chooses menu item 2}
+
(
2
3c −
1
3
√
c(c − 1)
)
· Pr{e buyer chooses menu item 3}
=
2
27
[
4 + c +
√
c(c − 1)
]
New we compute the objective of the dual program (D). And to prove the optimality of the menu, it suces to
show that the objective of (D) is equal to Rev.
Note that in our construction of the transport in R1 and R2, we only allow transport inside each region. In R1,
we transport mass from point 0 to other points. So it does not contribute to the objective of (D), and we can just
ignore R1. In R2, the mass is always moved vertically down. erefore, for any v, v′, such that there is positive mass
transport from v to v′, we have vi ≥ v′i, ∀i and ‖(v−v′)+‖1 =
∑
i max(0, vi−v′i ) =
∑
i(vi−v′i ) =
∑
i(vi−0)−
∑
i(v′i −0).
erefore, ∫
R2×R2
‖(v − v′)+‖1 dγ =
∫
R2×R2
‖v − 0‖1 dγ −
∫
R2×R2
‖v′ − 0‖1 dγ (4)
For the rst term, we have:∫
R2×R2
‖v − 0‖1 dγ =
∫
R2×T
‖v − 0‖1 dγ =
∑
j
∫
σj×T
‖v − 0‖1 dγ
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where the rst equation is due to the fact that our transport is inside each region, and {σj} is a partition of the region
R2. When the maximum area of σj approaches 0, we get:∫
R2×R2
‖v − 0‖1 dγ =
∫
R2
‖v − 0‖1 dµ+
=
∫ xD
0
(
v1 + 1 − v1c
) 2√
1 + c2
√
1 + c2
c
dv1 =
1
9
(
8 − 6
√
c
c − 1 + 5c − 4
√
c(c − 1)
)
Similarly, the second term of Equation (4) is:∫
R2×R2
‖v′ − 0‖1 dγ =
∫
R2
‖v′ − 0‖1 dµ− =
(
2
√
c − 1 − √c
) (
3 + 2c − √c(c − 1))
9
√
c − 1
For R3, according to Lemma 5.6, it is also true that when there is positive mass transport from v to v′, we always
have vi ≥ v′i, ∀i. erefore,∫
R3×R3
‖(v − v′)+‖1 dγ =
∫
R3×R3
‖v − 0‖1 dγ −
∫
R3×R3
‖v′ − 0‖1 dγ
For the rst term, ∫
R3×R3
‖v − 0‖1 dγ =
∫ c
xD
(
v1 + 1 − v1c
) 2
c
v1 =
1
9
(
1 + 4c + 4c
√
c
c − 1 + 2
√
c
c − 1
)
Similarly, for the second term,∫
R3×R3
‖v′ − 0‖1 dγ =
∫
v∈R3
6
c
(v1 + v2) dv = 127
(
1 + 5
√
c
c − 1 + 10c + 10c
√
c
c − 1
)
erefore, the objective of the dual program (D) is:∫
T×T
‖(v − v′)+‖1dγ =
∫
R2×R2
‖(v − v′)+‖1dγ +
∫
R3×R3
‖(v − v′)+‖1dγ = 227
[
4 + c +
√
c(c − 1)
]
= Rev
e above equation shows that the dual objective is equal to the actual revenue, which certies that the menu is
optimal.
When c ≤ 43 , the optimal mechanism only has two menu items.
eorem 5.7. For any 1 ≤ c ≤ 43 , suppose that the buyer’s type is uniformly distributed among the setT = {(v1, v2) | v1c +
v2 ≤ 1, v1 ≥ 0, v2 ≥ 0}. en the optimal menu contains the following two items: (0, 0), 0 and (1, 1),
√
c
3 .
One can prove eorem 5.7 with the same trick in Lemma 5.6. We omit the proof of this theorem since it is easier
compared to the other case described in eorem 5.3.
5.2.2 Optimal mechanisms under limited menu size constraints
In this section, we consider the optimal 3-Menu Mechanisms for value distribution U[0, 1]2.
eorem 5.8. e optimal symmetric at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1]2 is to
sell the bundle of two items at price
√
6/3, yielding revenue 2√6/9 ≈ 0.54433.
We defer the proof to Appendix A.
eorem 5.9. e optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism for two additive items with v ∼ U[0, 1]2 is to sell the rst
item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108 ≈ 0.546296.
By symmetry, the mechanism could also be selling the second item at price 2/3 or the bundle of two items at price
5/6. In particular, these is no other at-most-three-menu mechanisms could generate as much revenue as they do.
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We demonstrate the proof through the basic parametric method. Note that there must be a zero menu Z =
[(0, 0), 0], and hence we have two menus to determine. Suppose that the remaining two menus are A = [(α, β), p]
and B = [(γ, δ), q]. We then solve the following problem:
maximize Rev(A, B, Z)
subject to α, β, γ, δ ∈ [0, 1], p, q ≥ 0. (3Menu)
To establish the connection between the menus and the revenue, let SA be the set of values that menu A is the most
preferred:
SA = {(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2 |(v1, v2) · (α, β) − p ≥ (v1, v2) · (γ, δ) − q ∧ (v1, v2) · (α, β) − p ≥ 0}.
Similarly, we dene SB and SZ be the set of values where menu B and menu Z are the most preferred, respectively:
SB = {(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2 |(v1, v2) · (γ, δ) − q ≥ (v1, v2) · (α, β) − p ∧ (v1, v2) · (γ, δ) − q ≥ 0},
SZ = {(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2 |0 ≥ (v1, v2) · (α, β) − p ∧ 0 ≥ (v1, v2) · (γ, δ) − q}.
For any measurable set S ⊆ [0, 1]2, let |S | = Pr[(v1, v2) ∈ S] be the probabilistic measure of S. en the revenue of
the mechanism with menus A, B, and Z is
Rev(A, B, Z) = |SA | · p + |SB | · q. (3MenuRev)
With the above formulation, there are two major challenges to solve the program (3Menu):
• ere are too many possible cases with dierent formulas of |SA | and |SB |, hence the formula of Rev(A, B, Z).
In particular, there are 4 possible intersection paerns between the boundary of the square [0, 1]2 and the
intersection of each two of the menus (SA ∩ SB , SB ∩ SZ , SZ ∩ SZ ). Hence roughly 43 = 64 dierent cases.
• Even within each specic case, the revenue Rev is still a high-order function with 6 variables. In general, there
is no guarantee for closed-form solutions.
To overcome these two challenges, the following two lemmas are critical to reducing both the number of dierent
cases and free variables:
Lemma 5.10. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the optimal at-most-three-menu mechanism includes
bundling, (1, 1), as one of its menu.
Proof of Lemma 5.10. Without loss of generality, suppose that p ≥ q, and then there must be an optimal mechanism
with α = β = 1. Because by replacing menu A with menu A′ = [(1, 1), p], the set of values where A′ dominating B
and Z , S′A′ will be a superset of SA, and similarly, S
′
Z will be a subset of SZ , i.e., S
′
A′ ⊇ SA and S′Z ⊆ SZ . erefore,
Rev′ = |S′A′ | · p + |S′B | · q = |S′A′ | · (p − q) + (1 − |S′Z |) · q ≥ |SA | · (p − q) + (1 − |SZ |) · q = Rev.
Lemma 5.11 ([20, Proposition 2]). For v ∼ U[0, 1]2, consider a mechanism with a menu (γ, δ) such that γ, δ , 1 and
(γ, δ) , (0, 0), then by replacing the menu with (γ′, δ′) (the price of the menu may also be dierent), the revenue of the
new mechanism is no less than the original mechanism, where γ′ = 1 or δ′ = 1 or (γ′, δ′) = (0, 0).
Proof of eorem 5.9. By Lemma 5.10, we can x α = 1 and β = 1. Moreover, without loss of generality, we could
focus on the cases with p > q. Otherwise, the menu B will be dominated by menu A and menu Z , i.e., SB = ∅, hence
reduced to a two-menu mechanism, where the optimal revenue is at most 2
√
6/9.
Similarly, by Lemma 5.11, we can x one of γ and δ to be 1, without loss of generality, γ = 1. Note that in the
case with (γ, δ) = (0, 0), menu B will be dominated by menu Z , hence reduced to a two-menu mechanism again.
erefore, we remain to solve (3Menu) with additional constraints: α = β = γ = 1 and p > q.
Now consider the values v = (v1, v2) in SA ∩ SB , which must satisfy:
SA ∩ SB : (v1, v2) · (1, 1) − p = (v1, v2) · (1, δ) − q.
Similarly, SA∩SZ : (v1, v2) · (1, 1) = p, SB∩SZ : (v1, v2) · (1, δ) = q, and hence SA∩SB∩SZ : v∗1 = q−δp1−δ , v∗2 = p−q1−δ . Note
that if SA or SB is empty, there would be only two menus and the revenue cannot be more than 2
√
6/9. Otherwise:
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Figure 8: ree possible cases for the proof of eorem 5.9.
• For SA not being empty, we must have v∗2 < 1, hence:
p − q
1 − δ < 1; (NonEmptyA)
• For SB not being empty, we must have v∗1 < 1, hence:
q − δp
1 − δ < 1. (NonEmptyB)
Based on the constraints (NonEmptyA) and (NonEmptyB), there are three possible cases (see Figure 8). e solutions
under these cases are summarized by the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.12 (Case 1). Conditional on p ≤ 1, the optimal mechanism consists of asymmetric three menus A : [(1, 1), 5/6],
B : [(1, 0), 2/3], Z : [(0, 0), 0], and yields revenue 59/108.
Lemma 5.13 (Case 2). Conditional on p ≥ 1 > q, the optimal mechanism yields revenue 14/27.
Lemma 5.14 (Case 3). Conditional on p > q > 1, the revenue of the mechanism is not more than 1/2.
In summary, the optimal mechanism with at most 3 menus is to sell the rst item at price 2/3 or the bundle of
two items at price 5/6, yielding revenue 59/108.
6 Performance
Setup As our method is very ecient, we were able to perform our experiments on a laptop (13-inch MacBook
Pro, with 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM) using TensorFlow. To solve the problems with continuous value
distributions in nite neural networks, we simply discretize the value space. In particular, the discretization is pa-
rameterized by N , which is the number of the intervals (with length 1/N) in unit length. In other words, there are
N2 squares of size 1/N by 1/N in any unit square. By default, we set N = 100.
6.1 Eciency and Accuracy: Compared with Linear Programs
We compare the running time of our method and the straightforward linear program approach for the U[0, 1]2
seing. In the linear program, the variables are the allocation x1, x2 and payment p of the values on each discretized
grid (hence O(N2) variables) and the constraints are the IC and IR constraints (hence O(N4) constraints). We use
the basic PuLP package in Python to solve the linear programs. In Figure 9(a), we compared the execution time of
solving the linear programs with specic N ’s (N = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30) and the execution time of training our neural
network to (i) achieve a mechanism with at least the same level of acurracy as the one given by the linear program
(for N ≤ 30), and (ii) converge (for N = 40, 50, 200). Note that the running time of the linear program approach
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Figure 9: Running time and converge speed.
grows very rapidly: for N = 30, it takes 51 mins and we are not able to apply it to N ≥ 40. In contrast, the training
time of our neural network grows much slower (less than 5 mins for N = 200, i.e., buyer distribution support of size
40000).
One key advantage of our approach over the linear program is that our problem size grows linearly in terms of
the support size of the buyer’s distribution (i.e., O(N2)), while the size of the linear program grows quadratically in
terms of the support size (i.e., O(N4)). In Figure 9(b), we also plot the average training time for each iteration, which
is in 1 ∼ 30 milliseconds.
Figure 9(c) and Figure 9(d) illustrates that our method converges to the optimal very fast. e relative error also
drops very fast even in the log-scale plot. In particular, Rev is evaluated on the original continuous distribution
U[0, 1]2. Hence the gap between Rev and OptRev cannot drop to zero as we discretized the value distribution.
Conclusion So far, we have shown that our approach is much more ecient than the linear program appraoch and
hence much stronger scalability as well. To completement the time eciency, we also show in Appendix B that our
method also dominates the linear program approach in terms of accuracy.
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5.6
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Denote the upper boundary of R3 by B. For each v ∈ B, dene
RL = {v′ ∈ R3 | v′1 ≤ v1} and RU = {v′ ∈ R3 | v′2 ≥ v2}.
For any line lv through v with a non-negative slope (or innity), denote the part of R3 that is above the line by Rv . It
is easy to verify that µ+(RU ) ≥ µ−(RU ) and µ+(RL) ≤ µ−(RL). us there exists a line l∗v such that the corresponding
R∗v satises µ+(R∗v) = µ−(R∗v).
Now we show that for any two v and v′, the intersection point of l∗v and l∗v′ is not inside R3. In Figure 10, the
three regions R1, R2, R3 are the quadrangles OIDE , YCDI and CDEX , respectively. Let points A, B correspond to
the value proles v and v′. Assume, on the contrary, that the intersection point of l∗v (line AA′) and l∗v′ (line BB′) is
inside R3. en we have:
µ+(ACDA′) = µ−(ACDA′) and µ+(BCDB′) = µ−(BCDB′). (1)
Figure 10: e intersection point of l∗v and l∗v′
Note that µ+ is only distributed along the line CX inside R3. us
µ+(BCDA′) = µ+(BCDB′) = µ−(BCDB′). (2)
However, µ− has a positive density inside R3. erefore, we have
µ−(BCDA′) > µ−(BCDB′). (3)
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3), we obtain:
µ+(BAA′) < µ−(BAA′). (*)
Since µ+ is uniformly distributed along the line CX with density , we have that µ+(BAA′) = 2√1+c2 · l(AB), where
l(·) denotes the length of a segment. Similarly, µ−(BAA′) = 6c ·S(BAA′), where S(BAA′) is the area of triangle BAA′.
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Let h be the altitude of the triangle BAA′ with respect to the base AB. So
S(BAA′) = 12 l(AB) · h
≤ 12 l(AB) · l(EF)
=
1
2 l(AB) ·
c −
(
2
3c − 13
√
c(c − 1)
)
√
1 + c2
= l(AB) · c +
√
c(c − 1)
6
√
1 + c2
where line EF is perpendicular to line CX . en
µ−(BAA′) = 6c · S(BAA
′)
≤ 6
c
· l(AB) · c +
√
c(c − 1)
6
√
1 + c2
= l(AB) · c +
√
c(c − 1)
c
√
1 + c2
≤ l(AB) · 2√
1 + c2
= µ+(BAA′)
which contradicts to Equation (*).
Consider the set of lines K = {l∗v | v ∈ B}. Since we have already shown that no two of these lines have an
intersection point inside R3, the line set K actually cuts the region R3 into “slices”. And for any “slice” s, we have
µ+(s) = µ−(s). erefore, for each point in B, we can nd its corresponding “slice” and move its mass uniformly to
all the points inside the “slice”. And since l∗v always has a non-negative (or innite) slope, we conclude that whenever
there is a mass transport from v to v′, we have vi ≥ v′i, ∀i.
A.2 Proof of eorem 5.8
Proof of eorem 5.8. Since (0, 0), 0 must be one of the three symmetric menus, the other two must have the form of
(α, β), p and (β, α), p.
Without loss of generality, assume that α ≥ β and α > 0 (otherwise α = β = 0, yielding 0 revenue). erefore,
if αv1 + βv2 < p and βv1 + αv2 < p, the buyer will choose the zero menu, (0, 0), 0.
Consider the following two cases: (i) p ≤ α and (ii) p ≥ α.
If p ≤ α:
Pr[αv1 + βv2 < p ∧ βv1 + αv2 < p] = 2 Pr[αv1 + βv2 < p ∧ v1 ≥ v2] = p
α
· p
α + β
.
en the revenue is
Rev = p · Pr[the buyer didn’t choose the zero menu] =
(
1 − p
2
α(α + β)
)
· p.
Hence
Rev =
(
1 − p
2
α2
· 11 + β/α
)
· p ≤ (1 − p2/2) · p =
√
(1 − p2/2) · (1 − p2/2) · p2 ≤ 2√6/9,
where the rst inequality is reached if and only if α = β = 1 and the second inequality is reached if and only if
1 − p2/2 = p2 ⇐⇒ p = √2/3.
19
If p ≥ α:
Pr[αv1 + βv2 < p ∧ βv1 + αv2 < p] = 2 Pr[αv1 + βv2 < p ∧ v1 ≥ v2] = p
α
· p
α + β
+
( p
α
− 1
)2
.
Hence
Rev =
(
1 − p
2
α2
· 11 + β/α +
( p
α
− 1
)2)
· p ≤
(
1 − p
2
α2
· 12 +
( p
α
− 1
)2)
· p = p2
(
p2
α2
− 4 · p
α
+ 4
)
Let x = p/α ≥ 1, the right-hand-side becomes
α
2 (x
3 − 4x2 + 4x) ≤ 12 (x
3 − 4x2 + 4x).
en consider the rst order derivative of x3 − 4x2 + 4x:
(x3 − 4x2 + 4x)′ = 3x2 − 8x + 4 = (3x − 2)(x − 2),
the local maximum is reached at x = 2/3. Note that in this case, x = p/α ≥ 1. Hence the maximum revenue contional
on p ≥ α is reached when p = α = β = 1, where Rev = 1/2 < 2√6/9.
A.3 Proofs for eorem 5.9
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 5.12
Proof of Lemma 5.12. When p ≤ 1, consider:
SB ∩ SZ ∩ {v2 = 0} : v1 = q, v2 = 0
SA ∩ SB ∩ {v1 = 1} : v1 = 1, v2 = p − q1 − δ .
Note that q ≤ p ≤ 1:
|SB | = 12 ·
(
(1 − q) · v∗2 +
p − q
1 − δ · (1 − v
∗
1 )
)
|SZ | = 12 ·
(
p2 − (p − q) · v∗2
)
|SA | = 1 − |SB | − |SZ |
en the revenue is
Rev = (1 − |SZ |) · p − |SB | · (p − q)
=
1
2
(
2p − p3 + (p − q)p · v∗2 − (1 − q)(p − q) · v∗2 −
(p − q)2
1 − δ · (1 − v
∗
1 )
)
=
1
2
(
2p − p3 − (p − q)
3
(1 − δ)2 +
(p − q)2(2p + q − 2)
1 − δ
)
=
1
2
(
2p − p3 + (p − q)3 ·
(
−
(
1
1 − δ −
2p + q − 2
2(p − q)
)2
+
(
2p + q − 2
2(p − q)
)2))
≤ 12
(
2p − p3 + (p − q)(p + q/2 − 1)2) ,
where the upper bound is reached if and only if: (i) p = q, or (ii) 1 − δ = 2(p − q)/(2p + q − 2). Remember that we
have shown that p , q, hence we must have 1 − δ = 2(p − q)/(2p + q − 2) and
2Rev = 2p − p3 + (p − q)(p + q/2 − 1)2 = 2p − p3 + (p − q) · (p + q/2 − 1) · (p + q/2 − 1)
≤ 2p − p3 +
( (p − q) + (p + q/2 − 1) + (p + q/2 − 1)
3
)3
= 2p − p3 + (p − 2/3)3,
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where the upper bound is reached if and only if p − q = p + q/2 − 1 or equivalently q = 2/3.
Substituting q with 2/3, we have
Rev = −p2 + 5/3p − 4/27 ≤ −(p − 5/6)2 + 25/36 − 4/27,
and its local maximum is reached when p = 5/6, hence
Rev = 59/108 ≈ 0.546296 > 2√6/9 ≈ 0.54433,
and the menus are:
A : [(1, 1), 5/6] B : [(1, 0), 2/3] Z : [(0, 0), 0].
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.13
Proof of Lemma 5.13. When p > 1 ≥ q, consider:
SB ∩ SZ ∩ {v2 = 0} : v1 = q, v2 = 0
SA ∩ SB ∩ {v1 = 1} : v1 = 1, v2 = p − q1 − δ .
Hence
|SB | = 12 ·
(
(1 − q) · v∗2 +
p − q
1 − δ · (1 − v
∗
1 )
)
|SZ | = 1 − |SA | − |SB |
|SA | = 12 ·
(
(2 − p)2 −
( p − q
1 − δ − (p − 1)
)
· (1 − v∗1 )
)
.
en the revenue is
Rev = |SA | · p + |SB | · q = 12
(
3p − 2p2 + (p − q)2 ·
(
− p − q(1 − δ)2 +
2p + q − 2
1 − δ
))
=
1
2
(
3p − 2p2 + (p − q)3 ·
(
−
(
1
1 − δ −
2p + q − 2
2(p − q)
)2
+
(
2p + q − 2
2(p − q)
)2))
≤ 12
(
3p − 2p2 + (p − q)(p + q/2 − 1)2) ≤ 3p/2 − p2 + (p − 2/3)3/2
=
1
54
(
27p3 − 108p2 + 117p − 8) ,
where the two inequalities are reached if and only if 1 − δ = 2(p − q)/(2p + q − 2) and q = 2/3.
Note that we have to ensure v∗2 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ (p − q)/(1 − δ) ≤ 1, in other words,
p − 2/3
(p − 2/3)/(p + 1/3 − 1) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ p ≤ 5/3.
Now consider the maximum of (27p3 − 108p2 + 117p − 8)/54 with p ∈ [1, 5/3], by the rst order condition, the
local maximum and minimum are reached at p = (4 − √3)/3 ≈ 0.75598 < 1 and p = (4 + √3)/3 ≈ 1.91068 > 5/3,
respectively. erefore, in this case, the revenue is decreasing in p and hence the maximum revenue is reached at
p = 1: Rev(p = 1) = 14/27 < 59/108.
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A.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5.14
Proof of Lemma 5.14. When p > q > 1, consider:
SB ∩ SZ ∩ {v1 = 1} : v1 = 1, v2 = q − 1
δ
SA ∩ SB ∩ {v1 = 1} : v1 = 1, v2 = p − q1 − δ .
Hence
|SB | = 12 ·
(
p − q
1 − δ −
q − 1
δ
)
· (1 − v∗1 )
|SZ | = 1 − |SA | − |SB |
|SA | = 12 ·
(
(2 − p)2 −
( p − q
1 − δ − (p − 1)
)
· (1 − v∗1 )
)
.
Note that (qδ − p)/(1 − δ) < 1 by (NonEmptyB), hence
p − q
1 − δ = p −
qδ − p
1 − δ > p − 1.
en the revenue is
Rev = |SA | · p + |SB | · q
=
1
2
(
(2 − p)2 · p +
(
−
( p − q
1 − δ − (p − 1)
)
· p +
(
p − q
1 − δ −
q − 1
δ
)
· q
)
· (1 − v∗1 )
)
≤ 12
(
(2 − p)2 · p +
(
−
( p − q
1 − δ − (p − 1)
)
· q +
(
p − q
1 − δ −
q − 1
δ
)
· q
)
· (1 − v∗1 )
)
=
1
2
(
(2 − p)2 · p +
(
p − 1 − q − 1
δ
)
·
(
1 − qδ − p1 − δ
)
· q
)
.
In the meanwhile, note that by (NonEmptyA), v∗2 = (p − q)/(1 − δ) < 1, hence 1 − v∗1 = 1 − (p − v∗2 ) < 2 − p.
erefore, we have
Rev = 12
(
(2 − p)2 · p +
(
p − 1 − q − 1
δ
)
·
(
1 − qδ − p1 − δ
)
· q
)
≤ 12
(
(2 − p)2 · p +
(
p − 1 − q − 11
)
· (2 − p) · q
)
= (p − 1/2)(−3p2/4 + 2p − (q − p/2)2).
Since p > 1 > 1/2 and p/2 < 1 < q, the supremum with q ∈ (1, 2] is reached when q = 1:
Rev ≤ (p − 1/2)(−3p2/4 + 2p − (1 − p/2)2) = (p3 − 5p2 + 7p − 2)/2.
According to the rst order condition, the local maximum and local minimum of the right-hand-side is reached when
p = 1 and p = 7/3, respectively. In other words, the supremum with p ∈ (1, 2] is reached when p = 1:
Rev < (13 − 5 · 12 + 7 · 1 − 2)/2 = 1/2 < 59/108.
B Comparison of Accuracy
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0 1
1
(a) Mechanism via LP
v1
v2
0 1
1
(b) Mechanism via our method
Figure 11: Uniform [0, 1]2 with discretization N = 10.
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0 1
1
(a) Mechanism via LP
v1
v2
0 1
1
(b) Mechanism via our method
Figure 12: Uniform [0, 1]2 with discretization N = 20.
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(a) Mechanism via LP
v1
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(b) Mechanism via our method
Figure 13: Uniform [0, 1]2 with discretization N = 30.
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